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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The jury below returned a verdict against respond-
ent of no cause of action. On motion made by plaintiff 
below, the trial court granted a new trial as against 
the several appellants, the latter appealing the order 
granting the motion. This appeal is to test the right 
of the trial court in granting the new trial. 
Appellants statement of the facts is extremely one-
sided. On a question arising in an appellate court as 
to the jurisdiction and use of discretion by a trail court 
as to the latter's disposition of a motion for a new 
trial, the sole inquiry of the appellate court is whether 
there was any competent evidence which would sup-
port a verdict in favor of the moving party. 
Stack v. Kearnes, 221 P2d 594. 
King v. Union Pacific R:y., 212 P2d 692. 
The ·facts as hereinafter stated are set forth to 
meet the test of the Stack, and the King cases. An 
elaborate review of all of the lengthy facts is thus not 
required. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent Uptown Appliance 'and Radio Com-
pany, Inc. ·was formed in November 1947 to do an ap-
pliance business and was operated by four men, three 
of whom had had business experience. (R. 681) The 
fourth was a certified public accountant. (R. 1412) 
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They opened '"hat the distributor for sevPral western 
states of R.C_._-\_ products ralled a beautiful store at 32 
South ~lain Street in Salt Lake (R. 535) and com-
menced business 'Yith seyeral lines of appliance goods. 
(R. 686, 689, 693, 696, 711, 720) Their business grew 
rapidly and by midsurnn1er of 1948 it was the largest 
RCA account in the territory. (R. 539) The defendant 
Flint stated to the '"'itness Earl it was one of his best 
accounts. Respondent did a gross business during 6 
months of 1948 of almost $225,000.00. (Exhibit AAA) 
Until the conspiracy got under way in December 1948 
the company al\\~ays paid its bills. (R. 541) 
In X ovember 1948 respondent opened a store on 
State Street called Radio City (R. 714) and also a 
warehouse outlet on Pierpont Street. (R. 722) From 
early summer until December of 1948 some dealers, 
including the defendant dealers herein, became con-
cerned about respondent and its prices. (R. 7 48, 750, 981, 
986, 1066, 1068,1070) Respondent sold goods at reduced 
prices. Its warehouse price-discount operation was par-
ticularly odious to defendant Royle, (R. 1999) Mr. 
Bennett of ZC1II, (R. 985) and of eoneern to defendants 
<Jraybar and the Paris Co. (R. 772, 1068) Defendant 
Flint had conversations -vvith Mr. Bennett and Mr. 
Dreyfous of Paris Co. in December, at the time of re-
spondent's diffieulties, in W'hich both Bennett and Drey-
fous exprPssed concern or dissatisfaction about price 
p1 1 l i c· i es of respondent. ( R. 1069, 9~i5) ) Defendent N ev-
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ins, operating the leased appliance departments of ZCMI 
and Keith 0 'Brien Co. complained many times to Ben-
. nett and others about the prices and policies of respon-
dents "across the street" (R. 982) 
The Pierpont warehouse was an inexpensive outlet 
located in relatively unimproved quarters in the ware-
house district (R. 729) of Salt Lake City, and merchan-
dise was sold at cost plus a mark up reflecting sales 
expense plus a margin for profit, passing the savings 
on to the consumer. (R. 733, 743) Arrangements were 
made with large groups of consumers through their 
leaders to purchase. Contacts were made by respon-
dent with Geneva Steel employees association (R. 730), 
Utah Oil, and Wasatch Oil employees (R. 731), Safe-
way employees, Navy Base and Hill Field employees, 
the Teamsters Union, and the Utah Federation of Credit 
Unions. (R. 735) For a period of seven weeks prior 
. to the working out of the conspiracy, the Pierpont store 
flourished. ( R. 7 44) 
Ed Moreau, a department head of Flint, warned 
respondent in November 1948 the latter "\\Tere to be 
"shopped," (R. 750) and on November 8th or 9th the 
Paris Co. made fro1n Uptown a purchase of a Zenith 
radio at a discount. (R. 1149, 2149, Ex. CCC) The sales 
slip of the "Rammelmeyer purchase" was given by 
Dreyfous of the Paris Co. to Flint. (R. 1876, 1075) 
Flint's m•an Moreau immediately ·confronted respon-
dent with the sales slip stating Flint was in difficulty 
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'vith the Paris Co., that a meeting vYas required by Flint 
'vho supplied respondent 'Yith considerable of its mer-
chandise. (R. 101:2) Two days later, December 12, at the 
meeting held at Flint's, defendant Flint admonished re-
spondent about its policy of cutting prices ~below those 
generally follo,Yed, stating that if it didn't quit, it 
'Yould be destroyed in 90 days, its lines taken away, its 
credit connections destroyed, that dealers were even 
then meeting to decide the fate of respondent. (R. 1015, 
756) 
On Decernber 15th representatives of defendants 
Flint and Graybar at different times called on respon-
dent and dicussed the objectionable price methods of re-
spondent's merchandising. (R. 760, 762) 
On December 16th Flint's represtenatives called, 
advising of the cancellation of all Flint lines of merchan-
dise supply except two, and by Christmas virtually all 
of Flint's merchandise had been returned. (R. 768, 1872, 
984) When Flint had shown his hostility to 'appellant, 
threating its downfall and cancelling Bendix washers, 
Kelvinator refrigerators, and Fowler water heaters, 
respondent had no confidence to continue with its Zenith 
and Columbia lines. ( R. 930) 
On December 17th defendants Flint and Nevin went· 
to Bennett of ZCMI 'and told him of the Pierpont store~ 
and its methods of discounting prices. Flint said Ben-
nett as head of a retail store, should know what was 
' 
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really going on. (R. 985) Flint testifie,d he told Ben-
nett he had terminated his sale of merchandise to re-
spondent; said he: ''I am not going to sell to them.'' 
( R. 1872, 985) 
Within a few days Bennett caused a cancellation of 
business relations with respondent, who had sold a very 
large volume of Easy washers supplied theretofore by 
ZCMI. · (R. 773, 986) The representatives of ZCMI, in 
relating the circumstances of the cessation of business, 
stated that Flint was the source of the trouble. (R. 
733) All ZCMI merchandise had been returned by J·an-
uary 8th 1949, (R. 779) 
On Deeember 20th a representative of defendant 
Graybar, Mr. Searle, told respondent that all his dealers 
were complaining about them, and that the Pierpont 
store must be closed or there could be no more supply-
ing of Hotpoint merchandise. (R. 772) 
On December 2.2 or 23, Graybar's man advised re-
spondent Nevins had called the manager asking if he 
intended to continue to sell Uptown (R. 774, 2080) re-
porting further that Standard Supply had made the 
same current inquiry, the latter selling Uptown radio 
instruments and records. 
'During this time respondent employed a coupon 
book for the sale of phonograph records whereby a pur-
chaser paying $20 cash for a book received $25 worth 
of .record·s. (R. 993, 780 A) During this time defendants 
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Royle, Bigelow·, the Paris Co., and Nevins all complained 
to the RCA Victor distributor about the practice, and 
later had a meeting in the Hotel Utah which included 
that subject for discussion. (R. 991, 591, 593, 595, 597) 
All these dealers put pressure on the RCA distributor 
to either discontinue selling records to Uptown or he 
"~auld ha-v-e to buy back their record inventory which 
entail about $80,000.00. (R. 557, 559, 5'61, 595, 1025) 
As an alternative, the dealers would advertise Victor 
records at great discount, the Paris discount being pos-
sibly 40%. (R. 596) The Victor distributor was told this 
would break him. (R. 595) 
Concurrently Uptown bought Decca records from 
defendant Salt Lake Hardware; and defendant Royle 
telephoned l\IcKee, the representative of Salt Lake Hard-
ware, asking if the company was aware that Uptown 
-was also using the coupon book to sell Decca records at 
a discount. (R. 944 A) Defendant Nevin's man Crowton 
called l\1cKee also. Because of dealer pressure, the RCA 
distributor induced Uptown to cease to use the coupon 
book. ( R. 592) 
On January 4th the department head of Gray bar 
ealled on Uptown, stating he had been that day at one of 
the largest Hotpoint dealers in town; that the only way 
he could leave Hotpoint in Uptown was for Uptown to 
conform to retail prices, and that respondent could sell 
no merchandise below the suggested retail price. ( R. 
1159) The Pierpont store had. been closed because of 
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the prior demand of the Hotpoint representative (Gray .. 
bar) and its inducement to quit the warehous·e opera .. 
tion, (R. 772). 
On January 4, 1949, Jules Dreyfous decided to call 
a meeting of the dealers to discuss Uptown's price poli-
cies. (R. 1077) He made arrangements for the meeting 
at Hotel Utah, and called defendant Bigelow requesting 
the latter to invite certain other dealers (R. 1078) which 
the latter did. Dreyfous personally invited Bennett of 
ZCMI, who attended to represent ZCMI and defendant 
Nevins. (R. 989) On January 5th the meeting was held. 
Ten persons were present including all of the dealer 
defendants. (R. 991) Dreyfous· opened the meeting ex-
plaining that Uptown was selling records at a discount, 
and was price cutting. (R. 992) Radio instruments were 
discussed, and Mr. Bennett explained that he ceased to 
sell Easy washers to Uptown; (R. 992) there was talk 
about respondent violating a fair trade agreement on 
Victor records. Lawyer Nebeker was called in by Drey-
fous who explained the fair trade law, observing that 
the dealers as a group should do nothing about the mat-
ter as it would have the appearance of a "conspiracy." 
(R. 997) Someone was delegated to ·call on the RCA 
distributor Earl. (R. 997) 
Dreyfous called on the RCA distributor immediately 
after stating to him that Uptown was selling records and 
Zenith :radio instruments 'a.t a discount and that he was 
going to do something about it. (R. 598) He stated 
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that '• other dealers feel the same way about it." "You 
have my ultiinatum; you either take the Uptown Appli-
ance Company ou.t of business, or I am going to dis-
count and sell the RCA Victor records that I own" and 
the discount would not be 1any 25%. (R. 597, 598) De-
fendent Bigelow testified Dreyfous was ready to run an 
ad discounting the records 40%. (R. 563) 
Im1nediately after the meeting, Bennett sent a shop-
per to Uptown who purchased records at a discount, 
(R. 999) sending them and the evidence to defendent 
Nevin's department f.or keeping. (R. 1000) After the 
shopping girl told Bennett she could also purchase Decca 
records at a discount, Mr. Bennett immediately tele-
phoned Mr. Wheeler, President of the defendant Salt 
Lake Hardware advising him of the discount facts. (R. 
1001), further stating Uptown's practice was "disrupt-
ing." (R. 1910) Mr. Wheeler testified respondent's 
price cutting "upset the market." (R. 1914) Decca 
records were not £~air-traded (R. 1914); Victor were. 
S.oon thereafter Salt Lake Hardware acted in double 
fashion. (Since the trial the U. S. Supreme Court has 
thrown out as unlawful the type of fair trading practice 
involved in this case. Schwegm.ann Brothers v. Calvert 
Distillers, 340 U.S. 925, 71 S. Ct. 491 
At this time, Mr. Ellis Wheeler treasurer of Salt 
Lake Hardware, telephoned Mr. Van Winkle, office man-
ager of Strevell-Paterson Finance, with whom Uptown 
had done over $100,000.00 of finance business, and asked 
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¥an Winkle if he knew ''that to promote their sales 
that Uptown Appliance was cutting prices." He then 
further stated that ''it was his opinion that in view of 
the fact that appliance merchandise was still ·critical 
during that particular time, that it was unwise from a 
merchandising standpoint, to cut prices." (R. 964) 
, On January lOth, defendant Bigelow, operating the 
leased appliance department of Auerbach's telephoned 
the RCA distributor three times importuning him to 
cease to sell Uptown, stating that the de1alers had all 
been together to force him not to sell Uptown. (R. 1023) 
He stated that the process to be followed by the dealers 
~rould put Earl the distributor out of business. (R. 1025) 
On January 11th Bennett of. ZCMI was called upon 
by defendant Flint who stated.he had heard the ZCMI 
had t•aken Easy washers out of Uptown; Flint wanted 
to know if it was true and when it was done. (R. 998) 
Bennett related to Flint the fa·cts, stating he had de-
prived Upto,vn of Easy washers -a few day prior. (R. 
1880) 
On January 12th, Salt Lake H~ardware advised Up-
town that they would be sold no more Decca record~, 
(R. 780) and the existing stock was immediately taken 
back. (R. 783) Just prior thereto Mr. McKee of Salt 
Lake Hardware had bad a conversation with Nevin's 
department head in ZCMI about respondent's price cut-
ting, and McKee had assured that department head ''-vve 
will -vvork the matter out to the best ·of everyone's feel-
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ing~." (R. 956) ~On another occasion 1at about this same 
time X evins phoned :\lr. Price, salesmanager of Salt 
Lake Hardware and objected to Uptown having Decca 
rero rds to sell. ( R. 783) 
On the same January 12th Mr. Earl 1and the factory 
representative from RCA Victor, Mr. Bullock, visited 
all the record dealers in Salt Lake to .discuss Uptown 
price cutting. ~lr. Dreyfous of Paris Co. stated to them 
that ~'he would absolutely not talk to us on any kind of 
compromise basis; th,at either we take out the Uptown 
Appliance Company or we could buy back his stock.'' 
(R. 557) Defendant Royle stated that as long as Earl 
sold to Uptown, he wanted no dealing with Earl, and 
that Earl could buy back his stock. (R. 559) Defendant 
~ evins stated: ''As long as those guys across the street 
are in business I am not in teres ted in doing business 
W'ith you on RCA Victor records." (R. 561) Defendant 
Bigelow of Auerbach's stated he knew the Paris Co. was 
to run a 40% discount add Qn Victor records and this 
\Vould hurt Eia.rl 's business. (R. 563) Just two days 
before Bigelow had importuned Earl by phone to cancel 
Uptown's buying privileges, (R. 1023) stating the deal-
ers had all been together. 
On January 13th the RCA Victor distributor de-
termined to cease selling records to Uptown and ad-
vised all the defendants dealers to that effect, each 
of "\-Vhom expressed approval for his action, (R. 601, 
605, 606) not\\rithstanding the account to be cancelled 
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was the best account in the whole territory. (R. 539) 
On January 20th the supplier of Capitol, Mercury 
and London records and Stromberg-Ciarlson radios 
refused to sell Uptown ·any more merchandise. 
On February 7th Graybar announced their unwill-
ingness to sell respondent more merchandise, even 
for cash (R. 788, 790, 793). Graybar knew of the 
loss by plaintiff of all the other sources for merchan-
dise, and had been told the loss of Hotpoint would 
me'an the end of respondent's business. (R. 790, 2075) 
Defendant Graybar stated as the only reason for the 
decision, the financial condition of Uptown, with the 
reply from the latter that their credit position was 
much sounder than when Graybar had started to sell 
to them initially. (R. 792) When Hotpoint was removed, 
Uptown had no more appliance merchandise and started 
to liquidate (R. 795 ), and dispose of its fixtures, lease, 
trucks, etc. 
In the last six-month period before the conspiracy 
began to reflect its effect, respondent did a business 
of almost a quarter of ~a million dollars. (Ex. AAA) 
Each distributor-defendant put evidence in the 
record that Uptown had a perfect right to sell at 
whatever prices it chose : Uptown ''could sell at any 
price they saw fit." (R. 1915) Flint testified he had 
no reason to disapprove the merchandising policies of 
Uptown, (R. 1873) yet he later stated he was opposed 
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to the Pierpont store, (R. 1883) repeating it to Ben-
nett. ( R. 985) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The trial court had jurisdiction to grant a 
new trial to respondent. 
2. A conspiracy between the defendants was 
fully proven at the trial. 
3. The granting of a new trial was neither arbi-
trary, capricious, nor an abuse of discretion but was 
based on a sound exercise of legal authority. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO GRANT 
A NEW TRIAL TO RESPONDENT. 
The principal argument of appellants brief begin-
ning at page 24 is that the trial court, by an invalid 
usurpation of power, granted ·a new trial to respondent. 
Their argument is bottomed on the proposition that 
the trial court did not ascribe reasons within the 
precise words of the new rules, and the reasons given 
are beyond the pale and without power to effect the 
new trial. This argument is wholly without merit. 
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It is als~o submitted that the last ~and most authori-
tative decision of this court is based on a record 
where the court below granted a motion for a new 
trial without giving any reason therefor. 
Stack v. Kearnes, 221 P2d 594. 
In the King case, post, the appellant quarrelled 
about the grounds upon which the lower court had 
granted the motion for a new trial, but the court 
paid no heed to such an argument. 
In a line of cases hereinafter treated, the doctrine 
IS aptly st~a.ted that the motion for a new trial will 
not be disturbed if it could have been properly granted 
upon any of the grounds asked for by the maker of 
the motion. 
We will take the position here that the words used 
by the trial court below are of no consequence ; and 
that the trial court in granting the motion used 
. appropriate words within the meaning and import of 
the ne\v rules. 
Respondent, 1n moving for a new trial, cited 22 
reasons therefo·r including those required by the rules 
and those stated by the trial court. ( R. 146, 161) 
Q·uESTION DECIDED BY UTAH SuPREME CouRT 
The Utah rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 59) set 
forth the essential terms and conditions under which 
a new trial may be given. Said rules follow substan-
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tially the rode "rhich has been in effect in Utah for 
many years, and which were taken almost bodily from 
the California Code of Civil Procedure. 
King v. Union Pacific Ry., 212 P2 692. 
This court in the King case and later in Stack 
v. Kearnes, 221 P2 594 reviewed the law on the 
"breadth of the trial court's discretion in granting a 
new trial'' and found it had a wide discretion. 
To review exhaustively these recent cases would 
be a needless expense here. They constitute a profound 
utterance clearly announcing principles found to exist 
in Utah and California law, as well as the roots of 
the Common La\Y for centuries. The King case reviews 
the lTtah decisions and calls attention to cardi:n·al 
rules to be here followed : 
In one of its earliest cases this court an-
nounced that where the testimony is conflicting, 
the granting or refusing of a new trial rests 
peculiarly within the discretion of the trial 
court. 
Newton v. Brown, 2 Utah 126. 
Where there is a substantial conflict of evi-
dence on a material issue we will not review 
the discretion exercised by the trial court in 
granting a new trial. 
Davis v. Utah Southern Ry. Co., 3 Utah 218. 
2 P. 521. 
Again in Utah Sta1te National Bwnk v. Liv-
ingston, 69 Utah 284, 254 P. 281, this court ap-
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plied the same· rule and upheld a trial court 
which had granted a new trial where the evi-
denc.e was conflicting upon an essential issue 
of the case. 
Thompson v. Bown Liv·e S'tock, 74 Utah 1, 276 
P. 651. 
This court then reviewed in the King case the 
California decisions which are carried automatically 
into our law with the enactment of the California 
ci vii code. This court said in that analysis : 
From an examination of the California de-
cisions, it is apparent that the trial courts of 
that state possess a wide latitude in granting 
motions f.or new trials .... 
In California it is not an abuse of discre-
tion f.or a trial court to grant a new trial 
upon the grounds of insufficient evidence to 
justify the verdict : 
( 1) Where there is a conflict in the evi-
dence or where there is substantial evidence 
which would support a judgment in favor of 
the party asking for a new trial, 
(2) unless a decision in favor of the mov-
ing party would have no legal support in the 
evidence, 
( 3) when the evidence is conflicting upon 
the issues to be decided since the trial court 
is ''at liberty to find either w~ay'' on the motion; 
also when the evidence is not conflicting, and 
all the proof seems to be favorable to one or 
the other of the parties litigant, since the trial 
court must determine the question as to the 
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'·probatiYe force or evidentiary value of the 
testimony'', 
( 4) even where there is sufficient evidence 
to support the judgment on appeal had the new 
trial been denied. (Note : the following are the 
cases cited in the l(ing decision for the above 
doctrines: 
Union Oil v. Hane, 34 Cal. App. 2d '689, 94 P2d 
387 
Ronza 'Wine v. Hardware Mutual Ins., 31 Cal. 
App. 2d 455, 88 P2d 260 
Erickson r. Grady, 119 Cal. App. 596, 6 P2d 1002 
Lave-rne v. Dold, 17 Cal. App. 2d 180, 61 P2d 497 
J( ehlor v. Satte-rlee, 37 Cal. App. 2d 116, 98 P2d 
759 
Glascock v. Watters, 136 Cial. App. 713, 29 P2d 
434 
The Rose v. Carte-r case, 29 Cal. App. 2d 191, 84 
P2d 174, cited with approval in the King case, is an 
example of the treatment needed in the case at bar, 
where defendant got a verdict. The appell~ate court 
observed the evidence against said defendant was but 
slight. The court further stated that the defendant's 
appeal was by no means unjustified or without merit, 
stating that there wa.s 
''a generous abundance of evidence in support 
of the jury's verdict. Indeed, in the light of the 
record, any other verdict could scarcely have 
been expected. Nevertheless the law is well set-
tled that insufficiency of the evidence to justify 
a verdict is a ground for a new trial which is 
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peculiarly within the discretion of the trial 
court and its order either granting or denying 
a new trial will not be disturbed on appeal, 
unless it appears there was a manifest abuse of 
discretion. '' 
With but ''slight evidence'' against the defendant 
he was required to undergo a new trial. In the c31se 
at bar, the court will be impressed, to say the least, 
with respondent's evidence that there was prima facie 
evidence of a conspiracy, whether the jury believed 
it or not. 
Prout v. Perkins, 69 P2d 194. 
The most recent declaration ·of this court on the 
question of the dis·cretion of the trial court to act on 
a motion for a new trial is S'tack v .. Kearnes, 221 P2d 
594; there the trial court goes one step further than 
in the King case and grants the motion without giv-
ing any reason for so doing, a practice evidently 
unanimously approved by _this court. The opinion 
observed, as to the holding in the King case : 
We held that where there appears in the 
record competent evidence which would support 
a verdict in favor of the party moving for a 
new trial, there is no abuse of discretion on the 
part of the trial court in granting a new trial 
upon that ground. 
Many cases have held that where there is sub-
stantial competent evidence, the trial court is fully 
authorized, and indeed it is its duty to grant the 
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motion, if in its judgment justice has not been done 
by the verdict. 
But here \Ye have our own Utah court going 
further in 1950 and approving the action of the trial 
court in the absence of any reason!s given by the 
trial court in granting the motion, and when there is 
but ''competent evidence,'' to say nothing of the 
standard of substantial, or uncontradicted evidence. 
Certainly the trial court had jurisdiction. 
In the well-reasoned case of Campanella v. Cam-
panella~, 269 P. 433, 1928, the supreme court of Cali-
fornia lays down the important rule respecting the 
'• general'' language used · by the trial court in the 
case at bar, as distinguished from specific words 
contended for: 
It is the well established rule ·of this court 
that when the order of the trial court in grant-
ing a new trial is general in its terms, it will 
be affirmed if it could properly have been· 
granted upon any of. the grounds upon which 
· the motion for it wa·s predicated. (Cases.) It is 
an equally well-settled and long-established rule 
of this court that an order granting .a new trial 
will not be disturbed upon appeal, except upon 
a showing of clear and manifest abuse of dis-
cretion on the part of the trial court in respect 
to granting the same. 
Scott v. Times-Mirror Co., 174 P. 312 
Weiseer v. 8. P. Co., 83 P. 439, 148 Cal. 426 
Morgan v. J. W. Robinson Co. 107 P. 695 
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In the Morgan v. J. 'W. Robinson case, supra, the 
trial court was unanim·ously affirmed by the California 
supreme court where the lower court had used the 
general language that the new trial '' i:s ordered to be 
and the same is hereby granted;'' thus no reason was 
given, as in the Stack case. Note also in the W eiseer 
case, supra, the· supreme court of California stated: 
It is the duty of the trial court to grant 
a new trial on such ground (insufficiency of 
evidence) whenever the judge is convinced that 
the verdict is clearly aga.inst the weight of the 
evidence . . . (Italics added.) 
In the Scott case, supra, the motion was made as 
in the case at bar on the grounds stated in the statute, 
but the motion was granted by the trial court in 
general terms: The Supreme Court of California stated: 
It is the well-settled rule of this court that 
when the order of the trial court in granting 
a ne-vv trial is general in its terms it will be 
affirmed if it could properly have been granted 
on any grounds upon which the motion for it 
was predicated. (Cased cited.) 
The specious nature of appellants argument of 
lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to grant a new 
trial is -vvell illustrated by reference to the pract~ce 
in Idaho where the same statutory reasons for giving 
a new trial are in effect as in Utah and California. 
1 Idaho Code Annotated 1932, 485, and 2 Idaho Code 656. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in MacDonald v. Ogan, 
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104 P2d 1106 took occasion to state, in a ca.se where 
the reason f.or the trial court granting a new trial were 
not elucidated: 
This appeal illustrates the great importance 
of trial courts specifying the grounds on which 
a new trial is granted. We have frequently 
pointed out the desirability of such a p-ractice 
and recommended its adoption by the ·courts. 
'Vhere a motion for a new trial has been made 
on several grounds and the trial court grants the 
same without designating the ground upon which the 
order is made, the order will not be disturbed on 
appeal if it could have been granted properly on any 
ground mentioned in the motion. 
Gray v. Pierson, 64 P. 33, 7 Idaho 540 
Penninger Lateral Co. v. Clark, 117 P. 764, 20 
Idaho 166 
Respondent here asked the trial court for a new 
trial stating twenty-two grounds therefor, including 
the grounds of the rule of "insufficiency of the evi-
dence'' and the verdict is ag:ainst the weight of the 
evidence ; ( R. 146) thus the decision of the trial 
court is supported by the best of authority. 
TRIAL CouE.T 's LANGUAGE AnEQUATE 
It is submitted that there is great and undisputed 
authority for the proposition that the language used 
by the trial court was substantially within the meaning 
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and powers set forth in the new rules. The trial court 
stated that the "verdict is against the weight of evi-
dence.'' The new rules, 59- ( 6), state a new trial may 
be had based on ''insufficiency of the evidence.'' It 
is further submitted that the two expressions mean 
one and the same thing. 
The terms ''insufficiency of the evidence'' require 
an analysis by the trial court of the evidence, and the 
weight to be given it. Such an inquiry forces considera-
tion of the . weight of the evidence. The terms are 
reciprocal. Indeed, the u·nited States Supreme Court 
said in a foundation decision many years ago, since 
widely followed, of the words ''against the weight'' as 
being vvi thin the terms ''insufficient evidence.'' 
Metropolitan Railroad v. Moore, 121 U. S. 558. 
The court in the same case further stated, in con-
struing the meaning of the words, and the powers of 
trial courts in applying them to the problem of grant-
ing new trials: 
In. many cases it might be the duty of the 
court to withdraw the case from the jury, or 
to direct a verdict in a particular 'vay; and yet 
in others, where it would be proper to submit 
the case to the jury, it might become its duty 
to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. 
That obligation, hovvever, is the result of a 
conclusion of fact, and in such cases the ground 
of the ruling is, that the verdict is not supported 
by sufficient evidence, because it is against the 
weight of the evidence .... it is admitted, also, 
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that by the construction placed upon the lan-
guage contained in § 804 by the courts of New 
York, it includes motions to set aside a verdict 
against the 1reight of evidence, as within the 
phrase 'for insufficient evidence'. This was 
the very p·oint deterinined in the case just 
referred to of ~:l.ngeo v. Dunc.a, 39 N.Y. 313. 
In .A.ngeo v. Dunca, supra, decided by the Ne'v 
York Supreme Court in 1888 that court lays down the 
solid and 'Yell-followed rule that there is no want of 
power in the judge presiding at the trial to set :aside 
a verdict rendered by a jury, when it is p-alpably 
against law, or wholly and clearly unw·arranted by the 
evidence. The appellate court held that .a code pro-
vision of that state granting a new trial for insuffi-
cient evidence, among other reasons, did not. by any 
implication limit or abridge the power which would 
exist had the code provision not been enacted. In 
other words the old New York decision is the basis 
for the generalization used by many modern text's to 
the effect that: 
Power or .authority to order a new trial is 
in its inception a common-law right, and is 
inherent in all courts of general common-law 
jurisdiction. . . . A statute which purports to 
limit this power, being in derogation of the 
common law, should be strictly construed. Nor 
will a statute governing new trials be construed 
to restrict the a U:thori ty .of the court unless the 
intention of the legislature so to do is plainly 
manifested. 39 Am. Jur. 34 
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Inland a;nd Seaboa.rd Coasting Co. ~· Hall, 124 
u.s. 121 
The California Suprem·e Court has several times 
held that insufficiency of the evidence means want of 
evidence as' well as contrary to the weight of the evi-
dence. 
0 amp.a.nella v. C.amp·anella, 269 P. 433 
In re Bainbridges Estate, 146 P. 427 
Southern Pac. L.and Co. v. Dickerson, 204 P. 576 
In re Caspar's Estate, 155 P. 631. 
In the Bainbridge Estate case, supra, the supreme 
court of California clearly construed as similar the 
meaning of the terms here under review: 
In the determination of a motion for a new 
trial, the verdict should be set· aside if, in the 
opinion of the trial court, it is not supported 
by sufficient evidence; and this is equally true 
vvhether there be an absence of evidence or that 
the evid.ence received, in the individual judgment 
of the trial judge, is lacking in probative force 
to establish the proposition of fact to vrhich it 
is addressed. This is the meaning of the tern1s 
''insufficiency of evidence'' and ''contrary to 
evidence. '' 
The narrow construction argued by the defendants 
to the effect that the trial court must find for. a nevv 
trial specifically within the words of the new rules 
is further made ridiculous by the following quotation 
appearing in the same Bainbridges Estate, supra, where 
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the san1e court quotes from an earlier California deci-
sion by the same court as follows: 
\\"""hile it is the exclusive province of the jury 
to find the facts, it is nevertheless one of the 
most important requirements of the trial judge 
to see to it that this function of the jury is 
intelligently and justly exercised. In this re-
spect, 'vhile he cannot competently interfere with 
or control the jury in passing upon the evidence, 
he nevertheless exercises a very salutary super-
Yisory power over their verdict. In the exercise 
of that power he should always satisfy himself 
that the evidence as a whole is sufficient to 
sustain the verdict found, and, if in his sound 
judgment it is not, he should unhesitatingly say 
so, and set the verdict aside. 
In the case at bar, the trial court was not at all 
satisfied by the verdict as rendered. In no uncertain 
"Tords it has so stated. To the court who vie,ved the 
witnesses, heard and saw the entire panorama of this 
most interesting and significant trial, his feelings were 
so strong as to compel him to state that ''a new trial 
is required to prevent a miscarriage of justice.'' Such 
strong language is certainly not to be lightly looked 
upon. The evidence w.a.s full. It was contested. ~on 
the question of the existence of a conspiracy, it is evi-
dent that the court felt there was strong evidence 
upon \vhich a jury could well find for the plaintiff'.~ 
even under the high standard of evidence required 
under its instructions. He \Vas not satisfied that the 
jury had properly understood and acted upon the evi-
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duty to gr:ant a new trial under the timely motion 
made by respondent. 
In Weiseer v. Southern Pac. Ry., 83 P. 439, the 
California Supreme Cou·rt, in upholding the granting 
of a new trial against a verdict for plaintiff awarding 
substantial damages, observed not only the trial court 
had used but general language in granting the new 
trial but specifically used the very words used by 
the trial ca~e in the case at bar as follows:' 
It is ·established by numerous decisions of 
this court that, although there may be some 
conflict in the testimony, it is the duty of the . 
trial court to grant a new trial on such ground, 
whenever the judge is convinced that the verdict 
is clearly against the w-eight of the evidence, and 
his action in that regard will not be disturbed 
unless it is apparent that there has been an abuse 
of discretion. 
Attention is called to the statutory authority in 
California during all of the times the above cited cases 
were being decided, almost exactly similar to those 
provisions stated in the new Utah Rules. Yet the 
California court has used the expression "weight of 
the evidence" almost intercha~geably with "insuffi-
ciency of the evidence.'' Clearly the trial court in 
the case at bar had the same reasoning in mind and 
that with good and sufficient legal authority. 
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In So·uthern Pac. Land Co. v. Dickerson, supra, 
the court held: 
... the code of Civil Procedure authorizes .a 
new trial upon th·e grotmd of ''insufficiency of 
the evidence to justify the verdict'' "\V hich has 
been interpreted as applying not only to cases 
"~here the verdict is contrary to the weight of 
the evidence, but "'here there is no evidence to 
support the verdict. (Citing Estate of Bainbridge, 
supra, and Estate of Caspar, 172 Cal. 147. 155 
Pac. 631. 
In Re Caspar's Estate, supra, notwithstanding 
there \Yas in existence the same civil rules governing 
the granting of new trials, the Supreme Court of 
California found in 1916 as follows: 
In this state, though the evidence pro and 
con upon the issues be substantial and conflicting, 
it is the duty of the trial judge to set aside a 
verdict at least once if his conviction is that that 
verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence. 
Emrnons v. Sheldon, 26 Wis. 648 
Appellants' brief at page 27 states "there is no 
authority for setting aside a verdict because the trial 
judge thinks it is against the weight of the evidence.'' 
Nothing could be further from the truth. 
This court's opinion in the King case gives with 
approval a long analysis of Nelson v. Angelus Hospital 
Assn., 23 Cal. App. 2d 71, 72 P2d 169 quoting at length. 
Both expressions used by the trial court in the case 
at ba.r appear profusely in the King case in the cases 
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quoted therein. The Utah court quoted the California 
court as follows : 
To the contrary, notwithstanding any such 
conflict, or even though the apparent weight of 
the evidence should be in support of the verdict 
or ·decision, since it is the personal duty of the 
trial judge to weigh and consider the evidence 
and to reach a just conclusion thereon, if he be 
satisfied that the verdict or decision in question 
is not in fact supported by the evidence, or that 
it is contrary to the weight of the evidence, he 
is not only authorized, but it is his bounden 
duty to grant the motion for new trial. 30 Cal. 
Jur. 117. . .. all that is required to sustain it 
is the fact that the record discloses substantial 
evidence in support of the conclusion that has 
been reached by the trial court in that respect. 
The same King opinio~ quotes with approval the 
following language from Garrison v. U.S., 62 F2d 41, 
using both the expressions appearing in Judge J epp-
son 's order granting a new trial: 
Where there is substantial evidence in sup-
port of the plaintiff's case, the judge may not 
direct a verdict against him even though he 
may not believe his evidence or think that the 
"\veight of the evidence is on the other side ; for 
under the constitutional guarantee of trial by 
jury, it is for the jury to weigh the evidence 
and pass upon its credibility. He may, however 
set aside a verdict supported by substantial evi-
dence where in his opinion it is contrary to the 
clear weight of the evidence or is based upon 
evidence "\\Thich is false: for even though the 
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evidence be sufficient to preclude the direction 
of a verdict, it is still his duty to exercise his 
power oYer the proceedings before him to 
prevent a JJl iscar,riage of justice. 
The words ''"'"eight of the evidence is against the 
decision'' used in connection with the granting of a 
new trial are quoted again in the King case with ap-
proval from ll7hitfield v. Debrincat, 96 P2d 156. In-
deed the King case uses the expression almost itself 
at page 698 of the decision supra as follows: 
If what the defendant contends for were 
the la·w·, the trial judge would have no authority 
to U'eigh the evidence and decide a question of 
fact. -
The decision in the King case further and finally 
stated in approaching the constitutional issues involved, 
in quoting the United States Supreme Court in Wilker-
son v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53: 
All that resulted from the granting of a 
new trial "vas that the determination of the 
issues upon which liability was dependent was 
taken away from one jury and given to another 
jury. There was no usurpation by the trial court 
of the jurys' function. As was observed by 
Lord Mansfield in Bright v. Eynon, 1 Burrows 
390, the effect of a new trial is ''no more than 
having the cause more deliberately considered 
by another jury, when there is reasonable doubt 
or perhaps a certainty that justice has not 
been done. 
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Indeed, in an annotation on the subject referred to 
In the King case as 20 Cal Jur. at page 12 appears 
the interesting statement that the plaintiff is entitled 
to two decisions, one by the jury and another by the 
court on the motion for a new trial. 
Appellant would possibly undertake to mislead this 
court in its reference to the holding in Valiotis v. Utah 
Apex, 184 P. 802 at page 29 of its brief. That case 
does not help appellant at all. It is an authority 
squarely in favor of the action of the trial court belo\v 
in weighing the evidence. In that case the jury had 
returned a verdict for an injured plaintiff, and the 
trial court refused to grant defendant :a new trial. 
This court then refused to upset the verdict and the 
ruling as to a nevv trial on jurisdictional grounds, and 
a finding there V\Tas no abuse. of discretion. 
Appellants take the position that the trial court 
In passing on a motion for a new trial cannot weigh 
the evidence. This court \vill have to do a great deal 
of overruling if that is to be the lR\L Note the lan-
guage of the \Tali otis case at page 806 : 
It \Yill be perceived that counsel for appel-
lant does not contend that there was no evi-
. dence to support the verdict, but that the ver-
dict is so palpably against the clear weight of 
the evidence as to indicate that the trial ·court 
abused its discretion in refusing to grant a new 
trial. In other words, we are asked to review 
the vveight of the evidence. 
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It is undoubtedly true, as counsel for a ppel-
lant content that the trial judge n1ay and should 
set aside a verdict for insufficiency of the evi-
dence and grant a new trial whenever in his 
judgment the verdict is clearly and palpably 
against the ""eight of the evidence. Not to do 
so would be an abuse of his discretion. 
Of course the appellate court was precluded fro1n 
"~eighing the evidence but it clearly stated the trial 
court must. It n1ade no point as to a nice distinction 
between weight of evidence and insufficiency. It treated 
one as the reciprocal of the other exactly as the U.S. 
Supreme Court had done years before in the cases of 
"Jtletropolitan Railroad v. JJ;[ oore, 121 U.S. 558, and In-
land and Seaboard Coasting Co. v. Hall, 124 U.S. 121. 
, Appellants cite not a single case in or out of Utah 
to show that a trial court is without jurisdiction tv 
grant a new trial on the grounds asked for by respond-
ent and given by the trial court. The only cases cited 
by appellant are those where the appellate court 
refused on any grounds to interfere with the discre-
tion exercised by the trial court in not allowing a 
new trial. The James and V ali otis cases cited on 
pages 28 of app·ellants brief are no authority on the 
contention of appellants but support entirely the posi-
tion of respondent. In fact, app·ellants cite no case in 
its entire brief to support its position that the trial 
court was without jurisdiction, or exceeded the pro·-
priety of the occasion in granting a ne\v trial. All 
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they have given the court is an unconvincing argument 
without citation of any pertinent law. They have said 
the King case is not in point and there left the~ matter 
for specious argument, and reference to irrelevant mat-
ters in the record, not going to the question of whether 
some, or substantial evidence was shown of a 
conspiracy. 
Appellants make a great deal in their brief of 
the point that the court set a standard of evid.ence for 
the jury of ''clear and convincing,'' yet in granting a 
new trial, the court speaks of the ''weight'' of the 
evidence. We do not find that appellants have pre-
sented a single authority on the pertinent subject of 
inquiry f.~ this court. The issue before this court is 
not the quantum of proof requir;ed for a finding for 
plaintiff by the jury below. It is simply the question 
of the right of the trial court under proper motion, 
to grant a new trial for any lawful reason. The cases 
we have presented are unanimous on the subject, and 
the quantum of proof required for the jury to make 
a finding has no relevance to the question at bar. 
· The trial court had the discretion and wisely used it. 
II. 
A CONSPIRACY BETWEEN THE DEFENDANTS WAS 
FULLY PROVEN AT THE TRIAL. 
Defendants in the second section of their brief 
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state that "Plaintiff failed to prove that a conspiracy 
ever existed among the defendants or any of them.'' 
I 
The trial court believed a conspiracy was proven at 
the conclusion of respondent's case and denied a mo-
tion for non-suit. (R. 1708, 1712) There can be no 
question but what a conspiracy was proven. 
The court properly instructed the jury that ''under 
the statutes of the State of Utah it is declared that 
any combination by persons having for its object or 
effect the controlling of prices of any article of manu-
facture or commerce is p·rohibited and declared un-
lawful,'' and that any person who becomes a member 
of any combination, federation or understanding with 
any other person ·or persons to regulate or fix the 
price of any article shall be deemed guilty of a con-
spiracy to defraud, and shall be answerable in damages. 
(R. 107) This suit was bottomed on the law as stated 
in Title 73, chapter 1, UCA 1943, reflecting the man-
date of Article XII section 20 of the Utah Constitu-
tion. The whole body of law enforcing the Sherman 
Act of the United States Government serves as a back-
drop for the nefarious drama enacted secretly by the 
defendant conspirators. 
The evils of price fixing are well stated in Denver . 
Jobbers v. People, 122 Pac. 404, as follows: 
Pools, trusts, and conspiracies to fix and 
maintain the prices of the necessities of life 
strike at the foundations of government; instill 
a destructive poison into the life of the body 
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blight individual investments in legitimate busi-
ness; drive small and honest dealers out of 
business for themselves and make them mere 
hewers of wood and drawers of water for the 
trust; raise the cost of living and lower the 
price of wages ; take from the Average free man 
the ability to supply his family with necessities 
and wholesome food. . . . The wisdom and 
experience of all ages and all peoples have 
demonstrated the necessity for laws against 
such combinations and for the rigid enforce-
ment of them. 
U.S. v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392, 50 
AL·R 989 
Johnson v. Yost, 117 F2 53 
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251 
EasJman Co. v. Southern Photo, 273 U.S. 359 
Eastern s·tates Lumber v. U.S., 234 U.S. 600 
Ball v. Paramount Pictures, 169 F2 317. 
U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, 68 S. Ct. 915, 334 
U.S. 131 
American Tobacco v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781, 66 S. Ct. 
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park Sons, 220 U.S. 373 
U .. S. v. ,Griffith, 68 S. Ct. 941, 334 U.S. 100 
Hale v. Hatch, 204 Fed. 433 
Central Coal ·v. Hartman, 111 Fed. 96 
U.S. v. Socony Vaeuum. Oil1 310 U.S. 150, 60 
S. Ct. 811 
Straus v. Victor Talking Ma.ch., 297 F. 791 
Brown and Allen v. Jacobs Pharmacy, 57 LRA 
547 
Federal Trade v. Cement Institute, 68 S. Ct. 793, 
333 u.s. 683 
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But brief mention of the prima facie elements of 
the conspiracy need be mentioned; but each defendant 
before the court prior to the verdict is inescapably 
tied in. :Jlany of the things done might have been 
lawful ha.d they not been a part of a pattern or plan 
for concerted action, but the evidence shows unmistak-
ably the plan of all. 
Also as a property in the drama enacted, there is 
a great principle for \Yhich many people fight today 
called free enterprise. It is under this system that 
people a.re encouraged to make their own way without 
fear or favor. Price-fixing has ever been looked on 
with abhorrence by our system of law, except in short 
periods of history when people who do not believe 
really in free enterprise have the upper hand in demo-
cratic government. But in the end, the tyranny is 
cast down as was so recently done with what has been 
so grossly mis-named the '' F:ai_r Trade Practice Acts.'' 
Schwegman Bros. v. Calvert Corp·., 340 U.S. 925, 
71 S. Ct. 491 
The ten conspirators in this law suit went out 
to destroy a business which was run on the old-
fashioned principle of American competition. That 
respondent did not adhere to fixed prices was abhor-
rent to the appellants. Yet who can deny that price 
competition is not of the very essence of a free 
capitalistic competitive economy~ 
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That there was a conspiracy to fix prices, and 
that each of the defendants was tied in, is demon-
strated from the following : 
D·efendants Nevins, ZCMI, Royle, the Paris Co. 
were all concerned about the price policy of respondent 
and had had conversations with concerned persons 
by the 12th day of De-cember. 
Flint had sent his man 'to warn Uptown not to 
cut prices as the latter was being watched, but Uptown 
did its own business as usual only to have th:at same 
man return on December 11th to state Flint required 
them to make it right. (R. 751) 
At a meeting two days later between respondent's 
four officers and Flint, respondent's price-cutting prac-
tices were reviewed, and Flint warned Uptown's offi-
cers it would be destroyed within 90 days if it didn't 
quit cutting prices. (R. 756, 1017) The boycott com-
menced immediately under the leadership of Mr. Flint 
an~ Mr. Dreyfous. Note the succession of events all 
occurring within the next sixty days: 
1. Flint's cancellation of Kelvinator, Bendix, and 
Fouler lines was announced by him on December 16th 
and the merchandise was substantially out by Christ-
mas.· (R. 768) 
2. Flint and defendant Nevins visited Bennett of 
ZCMI (who had supplied Uptown with E:asy washeTs) 
the next day and discussed respondent's price cutting. 
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Bennett, NeYins, nor Flint liked it. Flint told of his 
ter1nination. Easy "rashers \Yere removed within five 
days from Upto,vn, and the ZC~II persons effecting the 
cancellation stated it 'Yas all the doings of Flint. (R .. 
773, 10~2) 
3. The Graybar Hotpoint man called on Uptown 
on December 22nd announcing that Nevins had called 
the manager about his supplying Uptown with merchan-
dise and that ·another supplier had done the same. (R. 
2080) He den1anded that the Pierpont store be closed 
as a condition of future supply by Graybar. Induce-
ments were suggested if Uptown would so close the 
warehouse. It did close the warehouse immediately, only 
to have the same company return on J anua.ry 4th to 
announce that Uptown could sell no merchandise ex-
cept at suggested retail prices. This mandate was not 
confined to Graybar merchandise but applied to all. (R. 
1159) Defendants Nevins and the Paris Co. were large 
Hotpoint aceounts. 
4. Defendants R.oyle and Nevin's man Crowton 
each called the Salt Lake Hardware complaining about 
the pricing of records by Uptown. (944A.) 
5. Dreyfous of the Paris Co. decided to call a meet-
ing of the dealers to see what they could do about Up-
town's price policy. The testimony shows the moth-eaten 
cloak of fair-trade laws "\Vas hoped to be a shield for the 
c-onspiratorial gathering, but the conspirators could not 
anticipate that the U. S. Supreme Court would take the 
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cloak from their sinful skins leaving them in the Hotel 
Utah meeting doing just what their eminent lawyer Mr. 
Nebeker told them they were doing, committing con-
spiracy. (R. 997) The subject of the meeting was price-
fixing unadulterated, :and what they could do to bring 
it about. They decided to send the man who had ·called 
the meeting to the Victor record supplier of Uptown 
and he certainly put the pressure on. (R. 598, 997) 
This was Mr. Dreyfous of the defendant Paris Co. They 
all put the pressure on, telling Mr. Earl that if he did 
not cease selling Uptown they would require him under 
the fair trade law to buy back their large inventories 
amounting to about $80,000.00, or they would flood the 
market 'at great discounts which would destroy his busi-
ness. Bigelow ealled Earl three times in one day urging 
cancellation. Earl succumbed. A week after the meeting, 
they had r~n Uptown out of the ·sale of Victor records 
and the dealer defendants applauded. (R. 601 to 606) 
But that was not enough. 
6. Mr. Bennett of ZCMI voluntarily, and no doubt 
at the prompting of Mr. Flint, did his additional and 
hurtful part and phoned the President of the defen-
dant Salt Lake Hardware advising the latter of the 
discount policies of U pto\\'"n, stating to Mr. Wheeler 
that Uptown's policy of price reductions was "disrupt-
ing.'' A more telling, conspiratorial word could not 
have been used by Bennett (R. 1914) Wheeler said Up-
town ''upset the market.'' This \\T!as no innocent call. 
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7. On January :20th the rest of the records went 
out, together \vith Stromberg Carlson Radio, leaving 
only RCA radio instruments and Hotpoint appliances 
as major lines. 
8. On Febn1ary 7th the representative of Defen-
dant Gray bar cancelled out Uptown's privilege to pur-
chase Hotpoint even on a C.O.D. basis, (R. 790, 793) 
knowing at the time this would mean that respondent 
could get no other merchandise, and knowing that each 
of the other suppliers had removed their merchandise ! 
Indeed Flint \Yas right. If the respondent corporation 
did not reform its co1npetitive price policy it would be 
destroyed, except that under the generalship of himself 
aided by Jules Dreyfous, Vice-President of the Paris 
Company, and also by Nevins, Royle, Bigelow, Gray-
bar's people, Bennett, and Salt Lake Hardware, it didn't 
take that 90 days. It is true, a coffin was pl~aced in the 
window of the respondent to announce to its friends that 
it \Vas no more to serve the public. That coffin is in 
the ground and \Yill remain until a new trail is given, 
and a jury of American citizens realize that injustice 
has been done. Possibly the respondent may not have 
the power to pursuade another jury any better than it 
did the last~ but the trial court saw and heard the fasci-
nating drama and could come to but one conclusion at 
the end of the case, that a new trial was required in 
order to avoid a miscarriage of justice. 
I 
Certainly this court will not substitute its judg-
/ 
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ment for that of one who saw so much and said appro-
priate words in his order ,granting 1a new trial. 
V.alotis v. Utah Apex Mining 184 P. 802. 
The meeting at the Hotel Utah was not, as of old, 
as stated in Ball v. Paramownt, 169 F2 317, "the pic-
ture of conspiracy as a meeting by twilight of a trio of 
sinister persons with pointed hats close together.'' It 
was, in terms of the law of this land a bald, unconscion-
able group of appliance dealers meeting for the unholy 
express purpose of eliminating Uptown Appliance as a 
competitor a.s it refused to join in illegal pricing of mer-
chandise. 
The conspirators claimed immunity under the cloak 
of a fair trade law that has been thrown out as contre-
vening the Sherm'an Anti-trust Act, 15, U.S.C.l. No'v 
that the fair trade law is no more, the mask is off. The 
appellants must answer for their illegal, conspiratorial 
meeting as though the fair trade law had never been 
passed. Indeed, as stated in 11 Am. Jur. 828. 
Since an unconstitutional la'v is void, the 
general principles follow that it imposes no 
duties, confers no rights, creates no office, be-
stows no power or authority on anyone, affords 
no · protection, and justifies no acts performed 
under it. · 
When these dealer defendants met to conspire the 
downfall of respondent, they met at their peril and 
were fore-warned by their own counsel. (R. 997) The 
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trial court clearly mandated that they should again 
ans,Yer for their wrong. 
III 
THE GRANTING OF A NEW TRIAL WAS NEITHER 
ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, NOR AN ABUSE OF DISCRE-
TION BUT WAS BASED ON A SOUND EXERCISE OF 
LEGAL AUTHORITY. 
The last point labored by appellant is that the trial 
court abused its discretion in granting respondents a 
new trial. Irrelevant matters in the record are referred 
to, to obfuscate the real issues involved in the use of 
the trial court's discretion. The question of law involved 
in the use of the trial court's wide powers is easy of 
understanding, although appellant's brief is entirely 
absent of any help to the court on the subject. 
Throughout all the cases, the courts have given 
wide power to the trial court to grant the new trial pro-
vided the ''record discloses substantial evidence in sup-
port of the conclusion that has been reached by the 
trial court in that respect. '' 
Nelson v. Ang-elus Hospital Assn., 72 P2d 169. 
While the King case suggests the same test, it is 
noted that in the Stack v. Kearns decision supra, this 
court stated that where there appears in the record com-
petent evidence which would support a yerdict in favor 
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of a party moving for a new trial, there is no abuse of 
discretion on the part of the trial court in granting the 
motion on that ground. 
The courts have uniform~ally held that 
where a new trial has been granted on the 
grounds of insuffiency of the evidence, the ac-
tion of the trial judge is conclusive on the appel-
late court, unless there has been an abuse of 
discretion . . . because the trial judge must 
weigh and consider the evidence of both parties 
and determine for itself the just conclusion to 
be drawn from it; and it is the duty of such 
court to grant a new trial if not legally satis-
fied with the decision. 
Hwnlon D .. and 8. v. So. Pac., 92 Cal. App. 230, 
268 P. 385 as cited in Prout v. Perkins, 69 
P2d 194 
rhe Utah Supreme Court in the King case, supra, 
also quoted with approval from Tell. v. Campden Fire 
Ins. Assn. 1 Cal. App. 2d 625, 37 P2d 131 a~ follows: 
If there is any appreciable conflict ... action 
of the court in granting a new trial is conclu-
sive on the appellate court. 
The courts indulge a presumption in favor of ·the 
proper exercise by the court below of its judicial dis-
cretion in granting a new trial upon the ground of the 
insufficiency of the evidence to support the decision. 
Prout v. Perkins, 69 P2d 194 
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The lTtah Supre1ne Court held in 1919 In Valiotis 
v. Utah-.A.pex lllining Co. 184 P 802 that 
,, ... hile the trial c.ourt may, as '''"e have seen, 
revievv the evidence, consider its weight and 
the credibility of "itnesses, and grant a new 
trial, if satisfied that there is a marked and 
clear preponderance of the evidence against the 
Yerdict, it is quite generally held that an appel-
late court has no such jurisdiction. 
In the case at bar, there is great and convincing 
evidenee of a conspiracy. It vYas predicted by Flint: he 
said if respondent did not cease cutting prices, it would 
be destroyed. Respondent was destroyed in precisely 
the way Flint had stated, 'and by the dealer defendants 
with the aid of certain distributor defendants of which 
he was one. Certainly the respondent's factual presenta-
tion before the trial court satisfies the test of ''sub-
stantial'' evidence, as well as the later test applied by 
this eourt in the Stack case that there must simply be 
''competent evidence'' which would support a verdict 
in favor of respondent. The record would certainly 
and ·without question support a verdict in respondent's 
favor. There was no abuse of discretion, although ap:-
pellant would drag in irrelevant matters in an effort to 
cloud the simple issue before this court. The matter of 
the trail court's alleged bias, treated in the latter part 
of appellants' brief as stated on page 67 of their brief 
'' vvas overcome by the verdict of the jury'' and should 
not further be labored. The court had the right and 
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duty to grant. a new trial if it felt justice was not done 
in the first trial. 
In Prout v. Perkins, 69 P2, 194 at page 195 the Cali-
fornia court laid down the rule as to abuse of discre-
tion as follows : 
When, therefore, an appeal is taken from 
an order granting a new trial on this ground, 
it is incumbent upon the appellant to show that 
the trial judge abused the discretion lodged 
with him and this can rarely he done except" 
by showing that there is no evidence which 
would have supported a verdict · for the re-
spondent. 
_ Hanlon Drydock v. Southern Pac., 268 P. 385 
Appellant would undertake to discredit respondent's 
evidence of conspiracy on various grounds. However, 
it must be admitted that in the language of the Stack 
case, supra, there was ''competent'' evidence, and in 
the language of a host of other cases heretofore cited, 
there was ''substantial'' evidence that defendants got 
together to achieve a cessation of respondent cutting 
pr1ces. 
The fact still remains that Mr. Flint took essential 
lines from respondent, and delibrately went with Nevins 
to Bennett and so told Bennett, the latter immediately 
thereafter terminating sales of Easy washers. Bennett, 
after attending the Hotel Utah meeting, wa.s primarily 
responsible for Uptown losing Decca records because 
of his call to the President of Salt Lake Hardware, the 
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latter company undertaking to help along the conspiracy 
by phoning the credit connection of Uptown, the Strevell-
Paterson Finance Company and discouraging business 
with a firm cutting' pric~. The Paris Co., through its 
vice president, gave Flint evidence of price-cutting on 
a Zenith radio which helped to precipitate the fateful 
meeting of Decen1ber 12th wherein Flint admonished 
respondents on price-cutting, predicting their downfall. 
All the defendants in the suit contributed to that down-
fall. Certainly there is some evidence, some competent 
evidence, some substantial evidence, enough evidence, 
to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff against each defe_n-
dant. And this quantum of evidence in the record is 
sufficient to deprive the trial court of any claimed 
arbitrary or capricious action. Its granting a new trial 
should not, nor indeed cannot, under the circumstances 
be disturbed. 
EFFECT OF DISMISSAL oF SoME DEFENDANTS 
Appellants take the erroneous view that because 
the trial court excluded certain defendants from its 
order granting a new trial that in a new trial e':idence 
concerning the dismissed person's connection in the con-
spiracy will be inadmissable hearsay. They cite .not a 
single case to the court to prove the point, and there is 
none. The fact remains that even though the trial court 
let ZCMI out of the conspiracy, the acts of Mr. Bennett 
are admissible, if he can be tied in as a confederate, 
and he can. There is no rule of evidence that a confed-
i 
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erate must be equally guilty at law with a conspirator. 
The law of admissability ·of evidence of co-conspirators 
does not require such to be charged with crime, or with 
conspiracy. The question is: Were the acts and decla-
rations made in pursuance of the common design and 
before the consumation of its purpose~ If so, the words 
and acts are admissible against those charged. The con-
versations between Flint and Bennett will always be 
admissible, whether ZCMI is a defendant or not. If a 
conspiracy is proven, those who act to further its pur-
pose whether charged with crime ·or civil consequences, 
are confederates; and their words and acts are admis-
sible against the other co-conspirators, even though 
such words and acts were uttered out of the presence 
of the other co-conspirators. 
Standard Oil v. Doyle, 82 S.W. 271. 
Samara v. United States, 263 F. 12, (2nd circuit) 
Peop.Ze v. Ferlin, 265 P. 230 (Calif.) 
2 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11th Ed., 1194 
1 Jones on Evidence, 4th Ed., 482 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the position taken by ap-
pellant is without merit, and that the ne'v trial granted 
by the trial court should go on without delay. Appel-
lants have cited no law' to support their position. Re~ 
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spondent has cited a host of cases, all representing the 
overwhelming authority back of the trial court's ~action, 
which in no event should be disturbed. 
WARWICK C. LAMOREAUX, 
RAwLINGs, WALLAcE, BLAcK, RoBERTs AND BLAcK, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
JULY 1951 
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